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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The empirical audit committee literature is both diverse and expansive,
with rapid growth in recent years based on increased concerns about corporate
governance and the quality of financial reporting. Our objective in this paper is
to synthesize empirical literature on audit committee effectiveness to guide
future thinking and research on audit committees. To organize our review, we
focus on four components that we believe contribute to audit committee effectiveness (ACE) - audit committee composition, authority, resources, and diligence.
Our motivation stems from the intensifying interest in audit committees
and the quality of audit committee oversight. Numerous professional publications (see Exhibit 1) address audit committee performance and responsibilities
in an increasingly complex global business environment where well-publicized
financial reporting challenges and problems are prominent. Expectations of
audit committees have increased dramatically [e.g., BRC, 1999; Burke and
Guy, 2001; Grant Thornton, 1997; Levitt, 1998; NACD, 2000; Rezaee and
Farmer, 1994; SEC, 1999b], with a number of high profile initiatives bringing
focus to the challenge of achieving effectiveness.
For example, the Report of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees [BRC, 1999] and the National
We greatly appreciate support from KPMG's Audit Committee Institute, the Corporate Governance
Center at Kennesaw State University, and The University of Alabama. We thank the editor, the anonymous
reviewers, Mark Beasley, Joe Carcello, Linda Hadden, Rich Houston, Tom Lee, and Terry Neal for their
helpful comments.
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Exhibit 1
Selected Professional Literature Focusing on Audit Committees

Audit Committees: A Guide for Directors, Management, and Consultants [Burke
and Guy, 2001]
Audit Committee Quarterly Updates [KPMG Audit Committee Institute, 2001]
Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on Audit Committees: A Practical
Guide [NACD, 2000]
Audit Committee Briefing: Understanding the 2jS' Century Audit Committee and
Its Governance Roles [Verschoor, 2000]
Improving Audit Committee Performance: What Works Best,
2000]

r

Edition [PwC,

Audit Committees: Implementing the New Rules [Ernst & Young, 2000]
Audit Committees: Implementing the New Requirements for the Year 2000
[Deloitte & Touche, 2000]
New Responsibilities and Requirements for Audit Committees [Arthur Andersen,
2000]
Final Rule: Audit Committee Disclosure [Securities and Exchange Commission,
1999b]
Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees [BRC, 1999]
Audit Committees: Best Practices for Protecting Shareholder Interests [PwC,
1999]
The Audit Committee Handbook, 3m Edition [Braiotta, 1999]
Shaping the Audit Committee Agenda [KPMG, 1999]
The Audit Committee Symposium: A Balanced Responsibility [Arthur Andersen
and FEI, 1999]
Global Best Practices for Audit Committees [Arthur Andersen, 1998]
The Audit Committee: A Broader Mandate [Bacon, 1998]
The Expanded Role of the Audit Committee [Grant Thornton, 1997]
The Audit Committee: An International Perspective [Vanasco, 1994]
Improving the Effectiveness of the Audit Committee [Rittenberg and Nair, 1993]

40

Journal ofAccounting Literature

Volume 21

Association of Corporate Directors' Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on Audit Committees [NACO, 2000] both provide numerous reco~
mendations for improving ACE and highlight the recent surge in interest m
performance quality. The SEC' s ne~ ~isclos~e rules for audit cOJn?littees
[SEC, 1999b], new stock exchange hstmg reqUirements related to audlt co~
mittees, and enhanced auditor requirements for communication with audlt
committees [e.g., A1CPA, 1999] also provide important examples of efforts to
improve ACE.
. .
In addition, a host of authors and organizations have issued publtcatlons
on "best practices" for audit committees [e.g., Arthur Andersen, 2000; Burke
and Guy, 2001; PwC, 2000; Verschoor, 2000]. Most recently, the SarbanesOxley Act [2002] tightened the defmition of audit committee member independence and required the external auditor to report directly to the audit co~
mittee. The major stock exchanges in the U.S. have proposed changes to thetr
governance-related listing requirements, partly to enhance the independenc.e
and expertise of audit committees.\ In all cases, reform efforts focus on identifying and controlling the various dimensions of ACE to strengthen oversight of
financial reporting, internal control, risk management, and auditing processe~.
In the next section, we provide background on the audit committee and lts
role in corporate governance. In section three, we provide a formal definition
of ACE and a discussion of ACE determinants to guide the subsequent literature synthesis (in section four) and discussion of future research directions (in
section five).
2.0 AUDIT COMMITTEE BACKGROUND
Boards of directors assume an important role in corporate governance.
Due to the separation of corporate management and ownership, boards exist to
protect the interests of the shareholders. Agency theory suggests that shar~
holders require protection because management (agents) may not always act m
the interests of the corporation's owners (principals) [Fama, 1980; Fama and
Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976]. To deal with this agency problem,
the board assumes an oversight role that typically involves monitoring th.e
CEO and other top executives, approving the corporation's strategy, and monltoring the control system.
Given its diverse responsibilities, the board of directors delegates some of
its oversight to the audit committee and other committees of the board. Many
publications prescribe three broad areas of audit committee oversight: (1) financial reporting, (2) internal controls to address key risks, and (3) auditor activity [e.g., Arthur Andersen, 1998; BRC, 1999; Burke and Guy, 2001; ~t
Thornton, 1997; KPMG, 1999; NACO, 2000; PWC, 1999; Rittenberg and Natr,
1993]. Numerous studies and professional publications provide detailed lists of

I
This background and the discussion of the extant empirical literature focus primarily on the U.S.
audit committee setting. As discussed later, we encourage additional research to explore the wide range of
financial systems, corporate governance mechanisms, and audit committee practices around the world.
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suggested duties within these three broad areas, and recent regulation [Sarbanes-Oxley, 2002] specifically prescribes certain audit committee functions. 2
Both the professional and the research literature [e.g., Beasley et aI.,
1999; BRC, 1999; Lublin and MacDonald, 1998; NACO, 2000] raise questions
about ACE in recent high-profile financial fraud cases. For example, the
NACD [2000, p. vii] states, "with each new wave of [financial irregularities]
the cry for more effective audit committees as an important part of the fmancial control system becomes even more urgent." Such concern has led to recent
regulation of the audit committee function in a number of areas, including independence, composition, expertise, disclosure of activities, discussion of financial reporting quality, and materiality assessment [e.g., BRC, 1999; SarbaneS-Oxley, 2002; SEC, 1999a; SEC, 1999b]. In addition, the major U.S.
stock exchanges currently are proposing audit committee-related changes to
their listing requirements. These proposals include provisions to strengthen
audit committee independence and oversight of financial reporting.
.
However, the audit committee's ability to achieve effective o~ersight is
inherently limited given the nature of the function. Audit committees only
~eet periodically, usually deal with complex but limited second-hand info~a
tlon, and include members with less knowledge of the company's operations,
controls, and reporting than management. Despite these limitations, stakeholders expect audit committees to provide effective oversight that protects
their varied interests.

3.0 AUDIT COMMITTEE EFFECTIVENESS (ACE)
3.1 Definition and Determinants of ACE
ACE has been defined in many ways and in many contexts [e.g., NACO,

~OOO; PwC, 1999; Rittenberg and Nair, 1993].3 We offer the followinl? defini-

tion of an effective audit committee as a starting point for our synthesIs of the
ACE literature:

An effective audit committee has qualified members with the authority
and resources to protect stakeholder interests by ensuring reliable f!nancial reporting, internal controls, and risk management through Its
diligent oversight efforts.

2
Specific duties often include reviewing financial statements and related disclosures, discussing various financial reporting items with management and the external auditors, review.ing reports of internal an~
ext~"?~ auditors regarding internal control issues, overseeing th~ scope of the tnternal and external audIt
actJvlttes, and meeting privately with the internal and external audItors.
3
For example, the NACD [2000, p. 1] stated that the effective audit committee is one that "adds value
to the board and the corporation." Kalbers and Fogarty (1993, p. 27] defined audit committee effectiveness
"~ the competency with which the audit committee carries out its specified oversight responsibilities."
RIttenberg and Nair [1993] defined an effective audit committee as one that fulfills its responsibilities. PwC
[1999, p. 3] stated that "to be effective, an audit committee must be able to oversee the company's financial
responsibilities without overstepping its responsibilities by becoming too involved in operational issues."

42

Journal ofAccounting Literature

Volume 21

This defmition highlights the ultimate goal of audit cOrnID:ittee ~ervice
(i.e., protection of stakeholder interests) as well as the manner m Whl~h the
audit committee achieves this goal (i.e., the use of qualified members With the
authority and resources to provide diligent oversight). Thus, we adopt a defmition that considers the input, process, and output dimensions of ACE. In addition, we extend the traditional focus on shareholders' interests (given the audit
committee's basic fiduciary responsibility assigned by the board of directors)
to assert that ACE should extend to a wide variety of stakeholders.
We use this defmition, the extant audit committee literature, and the team
effectiveness literature to develop a taxonomy for organizing the extant empirical ACE literature.4 This development is limited to the extent that the empirical literature focuses almost exclusively on individual audit committee
members and their characteristics (e.g., fmancial expertise, independence),
although audit committees are supposed to function as groups. As noted later,
there are numerous research opportunities involving the optimal mix of audit
committee members and the way individual audit committee members work
together to achieve committee effectiveness.
After considering the fundamental determinants of ACE, four dimensions emerge:
• Composition - expertise, independence, integrity, objectivity
• Authority - responsibilities, influence (derived from full board of directors, federal law, and exchange listing requirements)
• Resources - adequate number of members; access to management,
external auditors, and internal auditors
• Diligence - incentive, motivation, perseverance.
As Figure I indicates, we assert that audit committee composition, authority, and resources are the basic inputs needed to achieve effectiveness. For example, if an audit committee has independent and honest members with adequate financial expertise, the authority to act, and timely access to necessary
information, then it theoretically has a strong foundation for pursuing effectiveness. Upon this foundation of inputs lies the primary process factor needed
to achieve ACE - diligence. Audit committees that have strong composition,
power, and resources still need the will to act IJnd to expend effort in order to
be effective.

4
For example, Guzzo and Shea [1992] synthesized the psychology literature on characteristics of
effective teams and included the following elements - group composition, autonomy, nature of the task
(related to .effort level), and motivation/accountability. From a professional perspective, Ridley and Roth
[see FabnzlUs 1998] cited five elements of audit committee effectiveness - independence, training and resources, regular meetings, review of the assessment process, and unrestricted access to auditors. Braiotta
[1999, p. 6] focused on committee size and proper delegation of responsibility and authority as contributors
to effectiveness, while Rittenberg and Nair [1993, p. 2] concluded that the "key to audit committee effectiveness is [audit committee member] background infonnation and training." Similarly, McMullen and
Raghunandan [1996, p. 79] described the need for audit committees to be "independent, infonned and vigilant" in order to be effective.
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Figure 1
Determinants of Audit Committee Effectiveness (ACE)

output

ACE

1
process

1
input

Diligence
Composition

Authority

(e.g., Expertise,
Independence)

(e.g., Responsibilities,
Influence)

Resources

(e.g., Access To Management,
Extemal and Intemal Auditors

3.2 Composition
The major U.S. stock exchanges require that audit committees be composed of at least three independent, fmancially literate directors, one of whom
must have accounting or related fmancial-management expertise. Each stock
exchange provides a definition of independence and makes it clear that a simple "insider/outsider" dichotomization is inadequate. The ultimate objective of
such stock exchange requirements is to enable audit committees to make
judgments that are in the best interests of shareholders (i.e., independence is
required so as to promote objectivity on the part of audit commi~ee me~bers~.
The exchanges currently are in process of further strengiliemng therr audit
committee-related listing requirements. For example, the NYSE has proposed
tighter independence requirements and more expansive audit committee duties,
such as reviewing financial press releases and communications with analysts.
Similarly, AMEX and NASDAQ have proposed tighter independence and financial expertise requirements.
Team (group) issues also are relevant when considering audit committee
composition. For example, a number of leadership issues emerge when considering how audit committees function. While the audit committee chair often
assumes a leadership role, other leaders and dominant personalities can emerge
in a way that impacts ACE. For example, a member with a dominant personality, but limited financial oversight ability, could monopolize meeting time and
prevent the audit committee from functioning effectively. In such a case, the
audit committee chair would need to firmly bring the audit committee back to
its primary tasks. Alternatively, some audit committees may rely too heavily
on one financial expert such that the other committee members add little value
or fail to address issues themselves.
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3.3 Authority

The audit committee derives its authority from the full board of directors,
federal law, and exchange listing requirements. For example, the SarbanesOxley Act [2002] requires public company audit committees to be "directly
responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work" of
. the external auditor. The Act also states that audit committees have the authority to hire outside counselor other necessary advisors and requires external
auditors to discuss a number of issues with the audit committee.
We view authority as a function of the audit committee's responsibilities
and influence. The Public Oversight Board noted "in too many instances the
audit committees do not perform their duties adequately and in many cases do
not understand their responsibilities" [1993, p. 50]. To address this problem,
many groups provide guidance designed to help audit committees understand
their responsibilities and to pursue ACE [e.g., Burke and Guy, 2001; Cadbury
Committee, 1992; MacDonald Commission, 1987; NACD, 2000; Treadway
Commission, 1987].
The audit committee charter has become an increasingly important document for helping audit committee members focus on their specific responsibilities and for helping stakeholders assess the role and responsibilities of the audit committee [KPMG, 2000; SEC, 1999b]. Companies listed on NYSE,
AMEX, and NASDAQ now are required to include the audit committee charter in their proxy statement at least once every three years.
Audit committee authority (influence) also depends on the audit committee's relationships with management, external and internal auditors, and the
board as a whole. For example, external audit standards [e.g., AICPA, 2000]
provide audit committees with great authority because they require auditors to
communicate with audit committees on issues including detected fraud and
illegal acts, disagreements with management, and materiality.
3.4 Resources

The resource component of ACE highlights that effective oversight is
contingent upon the audit committee having adequate resources to do its job.
The NACD [2000, p. 13] discussed three keys to an effective audit committee
oversight process - "sufficient resources, meetings, and relationships." We
posit that the resources needed by audit committees to achieve ACE include an
adequate number of committee members to generate substantive discussion
and to consider emerging issues, as well as access to management, external
auditors, internal auditors, the full board, and legal counsel.
With respect to audit committee size, the NACD's Blue Ribbon Commission on Audit Committees [NACD, 2000] recommended that between three
and six members comprise an audit committee. The BRC [1999, p. 12] recommended and major U.S. stock exchanges now require audit committees
"comprised of a minimum of three directors."
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In tenns <;,f access to other corporate governance groups, it is difficult to
overstate the unportance of easy access to forthright infonnation from management, external auditors, internal auditors, and legal counsel. ACE is much
more likely in environments where audit committees have access to accurate,
timely and complete updates from management and auditors on changes in
significant accounting and auditing regulations, changes in the company's core
businesses, and current trends in corporate governance [Beasley et aI., 1999;
NACO, 2000].

3.5 Diligence
As noted earlier, composition, authority, and resources represent the three
primary inputs to ACE, while diligence is the process factor that is needed to
achieve ACE (see Figure 1). Similarly, Kalbers and Fogarty [1993] highlighted
that the audit committee member's will to act is arguably the most important
ACE attribute. Audit committees must be diligent in working to serve the best
interests of stakeholders. Diligence refers to the willingness of committee
members to work together as needed to prepare, ask questions, and pursue answers when dealing with management, external auditors, internal auditors, and
other relevant constituents.
The accounting literature includes numerous calls for audit committee
diligence [e.g., Beasley et aI., 1999; BRC, 1999; Horton et aI., 2000; Sommer,
1991]. For example, the BRC (1999] recommended that audit committees meet
at least quarterly, discuss fmancial reporting quality with the external. a~ditor,
and provide up-to-date charters detailing committee responsibilitie~. Sumlarly,
the NACD [2000] emphasized the importance of diligence when It suggested
that audit committees have four half-day meetings each year.
4.0 SYNTHESIS OF THE EXTANT AUDIT COMMITTEE LITERATURE

We believe that the four-component ACE description above provides a
basis for evaluating the extant empirical audit committee literature. Accordingly, we synthesize the literature by evaluating research contributions related
to the composition, authority, resources, and diligence of audit committees and
their members. Such a synthesis of the literature should facilitate an understanding of the empirical audit committee literature and provide a structured
5
means for identifying future research needs and opportunities.
4.1 Composition

One of the most common variables in the audit committee composition
literature is member independence. This area includes studies that focus solely
5 Our literature review focuses on published empirical studies in accounting and does not attempt to
integrate the vast non-empirical (qualitative) literature involving audit committees. In addition, we do not
review the extensive literature on audit committee existence or formation [e.g., Beasley, 1996; Dechow et
oJ., 1996; Eichenseher and Shields, 1985; McMullen, 1996; Pincus et oJ., 1989; Wild, 1996]. Given current
requirements in the U.S., audit committee existence is assumed.
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on inside and outside directors [e~g., Collier and Gregory, 1999; Menon and
Williams, 1994] and studies that consider "grey" area directors who are not
insiders but still have ties to management or the corporation [e.g., Carcello and
Neal, 2000; Vafeas, 2001].
A number of independence studies [e.g., Abbott and Parker, 2000; Archambeault and DeZoort, 2001 ; Carcello and Neal, 2000; Raghunand~ et aI.,
2001; Scarbrough et aI., 1998] focus on the impact of independent audIt committees on the audit function. For example, Abbott and Parker [2000] found that
audit committees without any insider members were more likely to use industry
specialist external auditors. This may reflect such audit committees' desire to
enhance audit quality. Archambeault and DeZoort [2001] found that companies
with "suspicious auditor switches" (changed auditors after disclosure of a reportable event, after receiving a modified audit opinion, or after other recent
auditor switches) had a smaller percentage of independent directors on the audit
committee than did companies without suspicious auditor switches. Both
Raghunandan et al. [2001] and Scarbrough et al. [1998] reported survey results
indicating that audit committees composed only of independent directors were
more likely to have stronger relationships with internal auditors than were audit
committees with one or more insiders.
Other studies highlight the link between audit committee member independence and fraudulent financial reporting or the informativeness / quality of
earnings. Abbott et aI. [2000] found that companies with audit committees
composed of independent directors were less likely to be sanctioned by the
SEC for fraudulent or misleading fmancial reporting. Similarly, Beasley et al.
[2000] found that fraud companies had less independent audit committees than
no-fraud industry benchmarks. McMullen and Raghunandan [1996] found that
companies with reporting problems were less likely to have audit committees
composed solely of outside directors. Klein [2002b] found that audit committee independence was negatively associated with abnormal accruals and that
reductions in audit committee independence were associated with large increases in abnormal accruals.
Other studies relate audit committee independence to governance and
company variables. Beasley and Salterio [2001] found that voluntary increases
in the number of outside audit committee members were associated with board
size, board independence, and the separation of the CEO and board chair roles.
Klein [2002a] found that audit committee independence was positively associated with board size and board independence and negatively associated with
growth opportunities and firms with accounting losses.
The independence literature extends beyond simple dichotomization
(where directors are either "insiders" or "outsiders") to consider directors with
various non-management relationships with the company. Since Vicknair et al.
[1993] highlighted the potential grey area director/member issue, a number of
studies have expanded their study of audit committee member independence to
include grey area directors. For example, Carcello and Neal [2000] studied
fmancially distressed companies and found a negative association between the
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percentage of affiliated (insiders or grey) directors on the audit committee and
the likelihood of receiving a going concern opinion. Vafeas [2001] used a relatively broad approach to defining grey directors in his study of audit committee appointments. Using an independence measure that screened directors who
were consultants, bank officers, lawyers, relatives of management, or otherwise had any economic link to the company, he found that new audit committee appointees were more independent than a control group of non-audit committee directors.
The audit committee composition literature involving member expertise
developed initially with a number of surveys and archival studies [e.g., Beasley
and Salterio, 2001; DeZoort, 1997; GAO, 1991 ; Kalbers, 1992a, 1992b; Lee
and Stone, 1997]. The relatively large number of studies in this area suggests
the importance of audit committee member expertise (and its underlying dimensions) as a necessary component of ACE. The results also indicate great
variation in expertise within and among audit committees, and that many
members lack adequate experience and expertise in relevant oversight areas.
From the survey literature, a number of studies have focused on audit
committee members' perceptions of their own expertise. For example, the
GAO [1991] found that approximately half of the 40 surveyed audit committee
chairs from large U.S. banks perceived their audit committee had no members
with expertise in assigned accounting, auditing, banking, and legal oversight
domains. DeZoort [1997] found that audit committee members believed that
all audit committee members should have sufficient expertise in oversight areas related to accounting, auditing, and the law.
Other studies reveal other stakeholders' opinions about audit committee
member expertise. The Raghunandan et al. [200 I] survey of chief internal
auditors (CIAs) revealed perceptions that audit committees with at least one
member possessing an accounting or fmance background were more likely: (I)
to have longer meetings with CIAs, (2) to provide private access to CIAs, and
(3) to review internal audit proposals and results. Kalbers [1992a, 1992b] s~r
veyed external auditors and internal auditors and found both groups had sIgnificantly lower opinions of audit committee members' expertise in oversight
areas than did participating audit committee members.
In addition to the survey literature, the archival literature addresses a wide
variety of research questions involving member expertise. ~cham?eault and
DeZoort [2001] found that companies with suspicious audlt~r sWltc.h~s had
fewer audit committee members with experience in accountmg, audltmg, or
fmance than their non-switching counterparts. Beasley and Salterio [2001]
studied Canadian boards and found that voluntary increases in audit committee
members' collective financial reporting and audit committee knowledge and
experience were related to board size, proportion of outsiders on the board,
and separation of board chair and CEO/president. Lee and Stone [1997] studied 100 U.S. multinational companies and described a mismatch between audit
committees' stated responsibilities and the levels of instrumental experience
(defined as skills related to accounting, auditing, and control issues) among
members. McMullen and Raghunandan [1996] found that companies with financial reporting problems were less likely to have CPAs on the audit committee.

Table 1
Composition Studies: Audit Committee Member Independence
Study

Method

Companies/
Subjects

Domain

"'"
QO

Results

Klein [2002a]

Archival

803 firm-years
on S&P 500

Financial
reporting

Audit committee independence was positively associated with
board size and board independence and negatively associated with
growth opportunities and firms with losses.

Klein [2002bJ

Archival

692 firm-years
on S&P 500

Financial
reporting

Audit committee independence was negatively associated with abnormal accruals, and reductions in audit committee independence
were associated with large increases in abnormal accruals.

Archambeault and
DeZoort [200 IJ
Beasley and
Salterio [200 I ]

Archival

Archival

Raghunandan et
al. [2001J

Survey

Vafeas [2001]

Archival

30 cos with suspicious auditor
switches

Auditor
switching

Companies that made suspicious auditor switches had a smaller
percentage of independent audit committee members than matched
non-switching counterparts.

627 pubJiclytraded Canadian
cos

Voluntary
improvements
in audit
committee
composition
Access to
internal auditors

Voluntary increases in number of outside audit committee members
was positively related to board size, proportion of outsiders on the
board, and separation of board chair and CEO/president.

114 chief internal auditors
(CIAs)
262 nonexecutive AC
. members

Audit committeemember selection

~

~

~

~
::t...

g
...::s
~.
;:

t-<

::;:

IIItl

~

~

Audit committees with only independent directors and at least one
member with an accounting or finance background were more
likely to have longer meetings with CIAs, to provide private access
to CIAs, and to review internal audit proposals and results.
New audit committee members generally had fewer years of service
on the board, served on fewer board committees, and were more
independent than the control group of other non-audit committee
directors. Audit committee appointments were not significantly
related to stock ownership and the number of other directorships
held.

<:

0

[

(Ij

N

N
0
0
N

Table 1 - (Continued)
Composition Studies: Audit Committee Member Independence

Study
Abbott et al.
[2000]

Method
Archival

Companies!
Subjects
78 pairs of fraud
and no-fraud cos

Domain

Results

Fraudulent
financial reporting

Companies with audit committees composed of independent directors were less likely to be sanctioned by the SEC for fraudulent or
misleading financial reporting.

~

~

<::>
<::>

Abbot and Parker
[2001]

Beasley et al.
[2000]

Archival

Archival

500NYSE,
AMEX,or
NASDAQ cos

Auditor selection

66 fraud cos in
three industry
groups

Fraudulent
financial reporting

Companies with audit committees that did not include employee
members were more likely to use specialist auditors.

Fraud companies in technology, healthcare, and financial services
industries had less independent audit committees than the industry
benchmarks. In addition, fraud companies had a lower percentage
of audit committees composed of all outside directors than did nofraud companies.

;t

~
~

a
<::>

,:lI

....::to..

9-

~~
II)

I:)

Carcello and Neal
[2000]

Collier and
Gregory [1999]

Archival

Survey and
Archival

223 financially
distressed cos

141 U.K cos

Audit (going
concern opinion)

The greater the percentage of affiliated (inside or grey) directors on
the audit committee, the lower the probability that a fmancially
distressed firm will receive a going concern opinion from the auditor.

Audit committee meeting activity

Presence of insiders on the audit committee was negatively related
to the level of annual audit committee activity (number of meetings
and duration of meetings).

t:
~

~

t).

~
I,C)

l

Table 1 - (Continued)
Composition Studies: Audit Committee Member Independence
Study
Scarborough et al.
[1998J

Method
Survey

McMullen and
Raghunandam
[1996]

Archival

Menon and
Williams [1994]

Archival

Vicknair et al.
[1993]

Archival

Companies/
Subjects
72 chief internal
auditors (CIAs)
from Canada

Domain
Internal audit
access

VI

0

Results
Audit committees consisting solely of non-employee directors were
more likely to (1) meet frequently with the CIA and (2) review internal audit programs and results of internal audits than were audit
committees comprised of one or more insiders.

Financial
reporting
problems

Companies with financial reporting problems were less likely to
have audit committees composed entirely of outside directors.

200 randomly
selected OTC
cos

Board rellance on the
audit committee

Audit committee independence is a proxy for the board's reliance
on the audit committee. As the proportion of outside directors on
the board increases, firms are more likely to exclude insiders from
the audit committee.

100NYSE cos

Audit committee member independence

A significant presence of "grey" area directors was noted on the
audit committees of the sample companies. Specifically, interlocking directorships and other related party transactions constituted the
most prevalent sources of independence questions.

51 cos with reporting problems

~

~

~

..a.
::t..

g
...::s
~
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;
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Despite the inherent challenge of accessing audit committee member subjects, experimental research involving member expertise is emerging to supplement the extant survey and archival literature. As with the literature involving auditor expertise, the experimental literature involving audit committee
member expertise started with tests for experience effects. For example, DeZoort [1998] evaluated how general domain and task-specific experience affect
audit committee members' internal control judgments. His fmdings indicated
that committee members with experience made internal control judgments
more like criterion group auditors than did members without experience. In
addition, members with experience made more consistent judgments and had
higher self-insight and consensus than did the members without experience.
Beyond studies of experience, the experimental literature is starting to
evolve to consider other dimensions of expertise (e.g., knowledge and ability),
with an emphasis on studying audit committee member affiliation in auditormanagement disputes. DeZoort and Salterio [200 I ] conducted an experiment
examining the effects of experience and knowledge on audit committee member affiliation in an auditor-management dispute case. Their results revealed
that independent director experience and audit knowledge were positively associated with audit committee member support for an auditor in a "substance
over form" dispute. Conversely, concurrent experience as a board director and
a senior member of management was positively associated with support for
management. Financial accounting knowledge and problem-solving ability
were not significantly related to support for either the auditor or management.
McDaniel et al. [2002] conducted an experiment using audit firm man~g
ers and executive MBA graduates to assess differences in the way fmanclal
experts and financial literates evaluate financial reporting quality. They fo"?d
that experts tended to focus more on recurring, less-prominent issues, whIle
literates focused more on nonrecurring, prominent issues. The au~ors conclude that efforts to enhance audit committee fmancial expertise may mfluence
audit committees' assessments of financial reporting quality.
Several consistent patterns emerge from the literature on audit con;unittee
composition. Audit committee independence is associated with (a) audit committees engaging higher quality auditors, interacting more with internal auditors, and protecting the external auditor from client pressure; and (b) a reduced
incidence of financial reporting problems. Thus, the literature indicates significant benefits associated with audit committee independence.
In addition, audit committee experience/expertise is perceived to be a
critical component of ACE, yet many parties have concerns with audit committee members' expertise levels. Audit committee experience/expertise is associated with factors including (a) greater interaction with internal auditors, (b)
reduced incidence of fmancial reporting problems, and (c) greater support for
auditors in auditor-management disagreements. The benefits of audit committee member experience/expertise are very similar to those described for independence above.
There are several limitations of the extant research on audit committee
composition. First, evaluations of member independence or expertise largely
are based on publicly available proxies (e.g., prior job titles, certifications,
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Table 2
Composition Studies: Audit Committee Member Expertise
Study
McDaniel et al.
[2002]

Method
Experiment

Companies!
Subjects

Domain

N

Results
When evaluating financial reporting quality, financial experts
tended to focus more on recurring, less-prominent issues, while
financial literates focused more on nonrecurring, prominent issues.

20 audit managers and 18 executive MBA
graduates

Financial
reporting
quality

30 cos with suspicious auditor
switches

Auditor
switching

627 publiclytraded Canadian
cos

Voluntary
improvements
in audit
committee
composition

Voluntary increases in the breadth of outside audit committee members' collective financial reporting and audit committee knowledge
and experience were positively related to board size, proportion of
outsiders on the board, and separation of board chair and
CEO/president.
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Archambeault and
DeZoort [200 I ]

Archival

Companies that made suspicious auditor switches had fewer audit
committee members with experience in accounting, auditing, or
finance than matched non-switching companies.

~
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~

~

Beasley and
Salterio [200 I ]

Archival

DeZoort and
Salterio [2001]

Survey

68 Canadian AC
members

Financial
reporting dispute

Independent director experience and audit knowledge were associated with audit committee member support for an auditor who advocates a "substance over form" approach in a dispute with client
management.

Raghunandan et
al. [2001]

Survey

114 chief internal auditors
(CIAs)

Internal audit
access

Audit committees with at least one member with an accounting or
finance background were more likely to have longer meetings with
CIAs, provide private access to CIAs, and review internal audit
proposals and results.
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Table 2 - (Continued)
Composition Studies: Audit Committee Member Expertise
Study
DeZoort [1998]

DeZoort [1997]

Method
Experiment

Survey

Companies!
Subjects

Domain

87 AC members
fromNYSE,
AMEX,and
NASDAQ cos

Internal control evaluation

112 AC members from NYSE,
AMEX,and
NASDAQ cos

Audit committee responsibilities

N
0
0
N

Results
Audit committee members with auditing and internal control
evaluation experience made internal control judgments more like
experts than members who lacked such experience.
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Audit committee members recognized the importance of having
expertise in accounting, auditing, and law, with some members
admitting they lacked sufficient expertise in these areas. Internal
control evaluation was consistently ranked as the most important
oversight responsibility.

Lee and Stone
[1997]

Archival

100 U.S. multinational cos

Audit committee responsibilities

Results indicate a mismatch between stated audit committee responsibilities and the level of audit committee member "instrumental" experience (related to accounting, auditing, and control issues).

McMullen and
Raghunandan
[1996]

Archival

51 cos with financial reporting
problems

Financial
reporting
problems

Companies with financial reporting problems were less likely to
have CPAs on the audit committee

Kalbers [1992a]

Survey

50 external auditors and 52 AC
members

Audit committee responsibilities

External auditors had significantly lower opinions of audit committee members' expertise in oversight areas than did audit committee
members.
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Table 2 - (Continued)
Composition Studies: Audit Committee Member Expertise
Study

Method

Companies/
Subjects

Domain

Results

Kalbers [I 992b]

Survey

61 chief internal
auditors and 52
ACmembers

Audit committee responsibilities

Internal auditors had significantly lower opinions of audit committee members' expertise in oversight areas than did audit committee
members.

GAO [1991]

Survey

40 AC chairs
from U.S. banks

Bank oversight

Approximately half of the audit committee chairs indicated that
their committee lacked members with expertise in assigned oversight areas related to accounting, auditing, banking, and the law.
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etc.), rather than on more complete assessments of independent thinking and
true expertise in fmance, accounting, or other relevant domains. Second, dimensions of composition such as integrity and objectivity have not been explored. Finally, research to date has left team/group issues faced by audit
committees virtually unaddressed.
Going forward, we believe that it is critical to enhance the richness of
measures of audit committee member independence, expertise, integrity, and
objectivity. In addition, group issues represent a fruitful area of research. Specific avenues for future research are offered in the concluding section of the
paper.

4.2 Authority
A number of studies highlight the authority dimension of ACE. This area
of the literature reflects strong emphasis on audit committee oversight responsibilities and focuses heavily on survey methods. In general, the fmdings indicate a great deal of variation in both perceived and stated responsibilities [e.g.,
Abdolmohammadi and Levy, 1992; Coopers & Lybrand, 1995; DeZoort, 1997;
Kalbers, 1992a] and the need to better understand responsibilities to improve
ACE [e.g., Rittenberg and Nair, 1993].
Coopers & Lybrand [1995] provided evidence suggesting that the scope of
audit committee activity had expanded considerably over the two decades prior
to the study. The survey results also revealed that most of the sampled audit
committees conducted a wide range of oversight duties. DeZoort [1997] surveyed audit committee members' perceptions of their responsibilities in areas
related to financial reporting, auditing, and overall corporate governance.
Members consistently ranked internal control evaluation as the most important
oversight area, with fmancial statement review and internal auditor/external
auditor evaluation considered highly important. Lee and Stone [1997] indicate
a mismatch between stated audit committee responsibilities and the level of
audit committee member instrumental experience (i.e., skills in accounting,
auditing, and control issues).
A number of studies move beyond evaluating specific audit committee
responsibilities. Haka and Chalos [1990] surveyed audit committee chairs,
management, external auditors, and internal auditors about their perceptions of
agency conflict. Their findings support the existence of agency conflict between audit committees and management in areas related to fmancial disclosure and discretionary accounting procedures. Audit committee chairs' opinions about issues affecting accounting choices also differed from opinions
provided by external auditors and internal auditors.
Kalbers and Fogarty [1993] surveyed audit committee members from 90
corporations to investigate the relation between audit committee power and
ACE. The results of their analysis indicated that effectiveness included oversight of fmancial reporting, external auditors and internal control. Audit committee power within the organization came from a combination of written authority and the clear support of top management.

Table 3
Authority Studies
Study
DeZoort [1997]

Lee and Stone
[1997]

Method
Survey

Archival

VI

0\

Companies!
Subjects

Domain

Results

112AC members, from
NYSE,AMEX,
and NASDAQ
cos

Financial
reporting,
auditing, and
corporate
governance

Audit committee members appreciated the importance of having
expertise in accounting, auditing, and law, although some members
admitted to a lack of sufficient expertise in these areas. Internal
control evaluation was consistently ranked as the most important
oversight responsibility.

100 U.S. multinational cos

Financial
reporting,
auditing, and
corporate
governance

Results indicated a mismatch between stated AC responsibilities
and the level of audit committee member instrumental experience
(Le., skills in accounting, auditing, and control issues).
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Coopers &
Lybrand [1995]

Survey

Members from
250 ACs

Audit committee responsibilities

The scope of audit committee activity expanded considerably over
the two decades prior to the study, and most of the sampled audit
committees conducted a wide range of oversight duties.

Kalbers and
Fogarty [1993]

Survey

EAs, lAs, and
CFOs from 90
U.S. cos

Audit committee and
power

Audit committee effectiveness included oversight of financial reporting, external auditors and internal control. Audit committee
power within the organization came from a combination of written
authority and the clear support of top management.

Rittenberg and
Nair [1993]

Survey

62 AC members,
94 CPAs, and 42
IA directors

Audit committee characteristics

Many members recognized that they needed to better understand
their specific responsibilities.
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Table 3 - (Continued)
Authority Studies

Study

Method

Companies/
Subjects

Domain

Results

Abdolmohammadi
and Levy [1992]

Survey

69 AC members

Audit committee responsibilities

Although audit committee members had varied perceptions of their
responsibilities, several broad areas emerged, including oversight,
relationship with external auditors, relationship with internal auditors, and financial disclosure.

Kalbers [1992a]

Survey

50 external auditors and 52 AC
members

Audit committee responsibilites

Audit committee members and auditors disagreed with the suggestion that the audit committee has very little authority, although audit committee members disagreed more than auditors.

Haka and Chalos
[1990]

Survey

External auditors, internal
auditors, CEOs,
and AC chairs
from Fortune
500 cos

Financial
reporting

Management and audit committee chairs had significant differences
in perceptions about financial statement disclosure and accounting
procedure choice.
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A few themes are evident in this area of the literature. First, audit committee responsibilities are diverse and appear to be expanding. Second, key areas
for audit committee oversight typically include oversight of fmancial reporting, auditing, and controls. Finally, audit committee authority is related to written authority and management support.
This literature has several limitations. First, no research appears to have
addressed the ultimate source of the audit committee's authority - the board of
directors - or factors associated with variations in such authority. Second, the
association between ACE and audit committee authority is relatively unexamined.
Going forward, we believe that it is important to track the expansion of
specific audit committee responsibilities, whether due to legislation, regulation, or market forces. We also encourage research on the degree of board
delegation to the audit committee (and variations in such delegation), as well
as research exploring the relation between ACE and audit committee authority.
4.3 Resources
Research involving the resource component of ACE has focused on support from the external and internal audit functions, and on the size of the audit
committee. A number of studies [e.g., Cohen and Ranno, 2000; Knapp, 1987,
1991; Schroeder et aI., 1986] highlight the importance of the external auditor
in pursuing ACE. Knapp [1987] found that the use of a Big 8 audit finn was
associated with increased audit committee support for the auditor in auditormanagement disagreements. This fmding is consistent with the notion that audit quality and auditor credibility are associated with audit finn size. A followup study [Knapp, 1991] revealed that audit committee members perceived Big
8 firms to be more likely to discover material errors than local firms. In addition, members believed that length of auditor tenure was positively related to
audit quality in early engagement years, but negatively related to audit quality
in later years.
More recently, Cohen and Ranno [2000] found that external auditors
made less favorable audit planning judgments in cases where the corporate
governance structure included an audit committee that lacked technical experience and regular access to internal and external auditors without top management present. In addition, Cohen et at. [2002] interviewed practicing auditors
and found that auditors viewed corporate governance as centered around management, rather than the board. The auditors viewed corporate governance
considerations as particularly important in client acceptance decisions and in
international settings, and many of the auditors viewed audit committees as
weak and ineffective.
Our review of the resource literature also highlights the specific importance of the internal audit function in achieving ACE. For example, Raghunandan et at. [2001] link audit committee member independence and expertise
to influence with internal auditors via private access to chief internal auditors,
amount of meeting time with chief internal auditors, and ability to review internal audit activities and results. KPMG's Audit Committee Institute [2001]
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evaluated audit committee members' perceptions about effective use of the
int~rn~l a~dit function. In a series of surveys, the Institute found a great deal of
vanatlon m the nature and extent of audit committees' reviews of reports developed by internal auditors. In addition, audit committee members tended to
agree that internal auditors are "well equipped" to identify material weaknesses in internal controls. The results in Beasley et al. [2000] indicated that
fraud companies in technology, healthcare, and financial services industries
had less internal audit support than no-fraud industry benchmarks. Raghunandan and McHugh [1994] found that audit committee involvement in the hiring
and firing of the chief internal auditor was associated with the number of meetings with the internal audit head. Finally, the results in DeZoort et al. [2000]
revealed that internal audit directors believe structured communications programs between internal auditors and audit committees could improve the quality of corporate governance.
Beyond focus on auditors as resources for the audit committee, Archambeault and DeZoort [2001] evaluated the impact of audit committee size on
suspicious auditor switching. They found that companies with suspicious auditor switches had smaller audit committees than companies without suspicious
auditor switches.
The overriding conclusion from the audit committee resource literature is
that support from the external and internal auditors is vital to ACE. Higher
quality external auditors are associated with increased audit committee support
for the auditor in auditor-management disagreements, and external auditors
appear to focus on ACE-related factors when assessing risk or accepting new
clients. Several studies suggest the unique importance of internal audit support
and interaction in promoting ACE, including the association between internal
audit support and reduced incidence of financial statement fraud.
A key limitation of this area of research is that two arguably critical audit
committee resources - information and outside advisors - have not been directly addressed. Interaction with auditors is a proxy for the quality of information provided to the audit committee, but it is not a perfect proxy. We encourage research that examines the quality of the audit committee's information set
and how this affects ACE. In addition, with the ever-increasing responsibilities
placed on audit committees, many are arguing that audit committees should
engage outside experts to assist them (much as compensation committees typically engage compensation and benefits consultants). Research exploring the
advantages and disadvantages of such an approach is warranted, as is work on
the Sarbanes-Oxley [2002] provision that specifically grants audit committees
the authority to hire such advisors.
4.4 Diligence

While a number of studies appear in this area, they tend to focus narrowly
on the most common proxy for audit committee diligence: the number of audit
committee meetings per year. To the extent that actual diligence is difficult to
measure, the relative lack of variation in approach is understandable. A few
studies also consider other proxies for diligence, such as voluntary audit committee disclosures.

Table 4
Resource Studies
0\

Study

Method

Companies!
Subjects

0

Domain

Results

Cohen et al.
[2002]

Interview

36 auditors

External auditing

Auditors viewed corporate governance as centered around management, rather than the board. Auditors viewed corporate governance considerations as particularly important in client acceptance
decisions and in international settings. Finally, many of the auditors
viewed audit committees as weak and ineffective.

Archambeault and
DeZoort [2001]

Archival

30 cos with suspicious auditor
switches

Auditor
switching

Companies that made suspicious auditor switches had smaller audit
committees than matched companies without suspicious auditor
switches.
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Raghunandan et
al. [2001]

Survey

114 chief internal auditors
(CIAs)

Internal audit

Audit committees with only independent members and at least one
member with an accounting or finance background were more
likely to have longer meetings with CIAs, private access to CIAs,
and review internal audit proposals and results.

Beasley et al.
[2000]

Archival

66 fraud cos in
three industries

Fraudulent
financial reporting

Fraud companies in technology, healthcare, and financial services
industries had less internal audit support than industry benchmarks.

Cohen and Hanno
[2000]

Experiment

96 external auditors

Auditor retention and audit
planning

Auditor planning judgments were affected by the strength of the
corporate governance structure. Companies with audit committees
that lacked resources and technical experience were more likely to
receive unfavorable audit planning judgments from auditors.
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DeZoort et al.
[2000]

Survey

18 internal audit
directors

Audit committeememher training

Internal audit directors suggested that structured communications
programs between internal auditors and audit committees could
improve the quality of corporate governance.

N

Table 4 - (Continued)
Resource Studies
Study
Raghunandan and
McHugh [1994]

Knapp [1991]

Knapp [1987]

Schroeder et al.
(1986]

Method
Survey

Experiment

Experiment

Survey

Companies!
Subjects
426 chief internal auditors

122 AC members from cos in
Texas

179 AC members

81 Fortune 500
company AC
chairs and 41
Big 8 firm partners

N
0
0
N

Domain

Results

Internal audit

Audit committees that were involved in chief internal auditor hiring/firing decisions met more often with the chief internal auditor
and were perceived to have greater ability to get management to act
on auditing findings.

External audit
quality

c~

~
,:-.

Audit committee members perceived that the quality of audit service provided is significantly related to auditor size and auditor
tenure. Exposure to different size audit firms moderated the audit
size effect. The perceived positive effects of auditor tenure in early
engagement years became negative in subsequent years.

Auditor-client Big 8 audit firm use was associated with increased support for the
disagreement auditor in auditor-management disagreements. In addition, memon subsequent bers were less likely to support the auditor when the members were
event disclonot corporate managers, when the auditee was in strong financial
sure and macondition, and when objective professional standards were absent.
teriality level
of proposed
adjustment
External audit
quality

t;:,

Audit committee chairs perceived audit team factors (e.g., the
amount of partner and manager attention on the aUdit) to be more
important than audit firm factors (e.g., relative fee size) when it
came to audit quality.
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Several studies using the meeting frequency prox~ deal w!th fraudulent
fmancial reporting. Beasley et al. [2000] found that audit committees of fra~d
companies in the technology and healthcare industries met less often ~an did
audit committees in comparable companies without reported fraud. The~ study
indicated that fraud companies generally only met once per year while ?ofraud companies met two or three times each year. However, when reportmg
this difference, the authors (p. 450) noted that even the no-fraud companies'
two or three meetings per year were "still below the NACD [2000] sugg~s
tion." Similarly, the results in Abbott et al. [2000] indicated that firms With
audit committees that met at least twice per year were less likely to be sanctioned by the SEC for financial reporting problems. Finally, McMullen and
Raghunandan [1996] found that companies with reporting problems had less
frequent audit committee meetings.
Some studies link the number of meetings with external auditor selection.
Abbott and Parker [2000] studied auditor selection for 500 companies and
found that firms with audit committees that met at least twice per year were
more likely to use specialist auditors. Archambeault and DeZoort [2001] found
that companies making suspicious auditor switches held fewer audit committee
meetings than companies without suspicious auditor switches.
. The literature involving meeting frequency also extends to consider interactions with other audit committee and company variables. For example,
Men0l'! and Williams [1994] studied 200 companies and found that the number
?f audit committee meetings increased as the percentage of outside directors
mcreased. In addition, meeting frequency was associated with firm size, suggesting positive associations among company size, monitoring complexity, and
the need for audit committee meetings. Similarly, Collier and Gregory [1999]
used .two ~easures of audit committee activity (Le., number and duration of
meetmgs) m their study <;>f U.K. companies. Their results indicated that the
presence of a dominant CEO and the inclusion of insiders on the audit committee were ne~atively related to the level of activity, while leverage and the presence of a Big 6 auditor were positively associated with the level of activity.
A few published studies have used different proxies for diligence. Kalbers
and Fogarty [1993] measured chief financial officers', chief internal auditors',
and external audit partners' perceptions of audit committee diligence, defmed
as t?e level ?f preparation, vigilance, independence, and level of activity of the
audit committee chair and other members. Their LISREL analysis revealed a
significant positive relationship between diligence and perceived ACE.
Alternatively, Turpin and DeZoort [1998] evaluated voluntary disclosure
of an audit committee report in annual reports and found significant positive
associations between voluntary disclosure of audit committee reports and company size, proportion of outside directors, leverage, and trade on a major stock
exchange. However, their results also indicated that management, not the audit
committee, tended to drive the decision for such voluntary audit committee
disclosure. In addition Carcello et al. [2002] analyzed voluntary audit
committee disclosures under the new disclosure rules implemented in 2001.
They found voluntary disclosure of audit committee activities to be more
common for depository institutions, larger companies, NYSE-listed companies, and companies with more independent audit committees.

Table 5
Diligence Studies

N

0
0

N

Study
Carcello et aI.
[2002]

Archambeault and
DeZoort [2001]

Abbott et al.
[2000]

Abbott and Parker
[2000]

Method
Archival

Archival

Archival

Archival

Companies!
Subjects

Domain

150 public companies on NYSE,
NASDAQ,or .
AMEX

Audit committee disclosure

30 cos with suspicious auditor
switches

Auditor
switching

78 fraud and nofrauc cos

Results
Voluntary disclosure of audit committee activities was more common for depository institutions, larger companies, NYSE-listed
companies, and companies with more independent audit committees.
Companies that made suspicious auditor switches held fewer audit
committee meetings than matched companies without suspicious
auditor switches.

Fraudulent
financial reporting

Firms with audit committees that met at least twice per year were
less likely to be sanctioned by the SEC for fraudulent or misleading
financial reporting.

500NYSE,
AMEX,and
NASDAQ cos

Auditor selection

Firms with audit committees that met at least twice per year were
more likely to use specialist auditors.
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Beasley et al.
[2000]

Archival

66 fraud cos in
three industries

Fraudulent
financial reporting

Fraud companies in the technology and healthcare industries held
fewer audit committees meetings than industry benchmarks.

Collier and Gregory [1999]

Survey and
Archival

141 U.K. cos

Meeting activity

Presence of a dominant CEO and insiders on the audit committee
were negatively related to the level of annual audit committee activity (number of meetings and duration of meetings). Presence ofa
Big 6 auditor and leverage were positively associated with the level
of annual audit committee activity.
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Table 5 - (Continued)
Diligence Studies
Study
Turpin and
DeZoort [1998]

McMullen and
Raghunandan
[1996]

Method
Archival

Archival

Companies/
Subject
33 cos disclosing
an AC report

5 I cos with financial reporting
problems

Domain
Audit committee report
disclosure
Financial
reporting

Results
Results indicated significant positive associations between voluntary audit committee report disclosure in annual reports and com-

pany size, proportion of outside directors, leverage, and trade on a
major stock exchange.
Companies with reporting problems were less likely to have frequent audit committee meetings.
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Menon and
Williams [1994]

Kalbers and
Fogarty [1993]

Archival

Survey

200 randomly
selected OTC
cos
External auditors, internal
audits, and CFOs
from 90 U.S. cos

Board reliance on the
audit
commmittee

Audit committee meeting frequency was positively associated with
firm size.

Audit committee effectiveness and
power

When evaluating dimension of power related to ACE, the will to act
was perceived to be the most important audit committee member
attribute affecting effectiveness.
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The audit committee diligence literature clearly demonstrates the importance of having an adequate number of meetings each year. Greater meeting
frequency is associated with a reduced incidence of financial reporting prob!ems and with greater external audit quality. Several factors, including board
mdependence and company size, are associated with meeting frequency. In
terms of other diligence research, one study documents a relation between assessed audit committee diligence and perceived ACE, and others have related
voluntary audit committee disclosures to such characteristics as director independence and company size.
The primary limitation of this research area is that actual diligence is not
observable by researchers, so various proxies must be used. While the number
of meetings provides some signal regarding effort, factors such as audit committee motivation and incentives have received very little attention. We encourage research on sources of audit committee member motivation, as well as
studies examining the effect of different audit committee member compensation schemes. As Kalbers and Fogarty [1993, p. 44] highlighted " ... audit
committee members must bring a desire to carry out their duties." Factors potentially affecting this desire have not been adequately examined. For example,
researchers could address the possible motivational effects of audit committee
stock ownership and the impact of penalties (litigation, reputation damage,
etc.) for poor audit committee performance.
5.0 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

The preceding review indicates that each of the four factors contributing
to ACE has been examined to some degree, but significant opportunities exist
in each area. Before offering more explicit suggestions for future research in
each area, we pose a fundamental research question: "Can the audit committee
ever hope to meet the expectations placed on it by various stakeholders and
actually achieve ACE given its current structure (e.g., part-time, limite~ ~e
sources)?" Addressing this question requires consideration of the upper It.mlts
of audit committee performance and changes in stakeholder expectatIOns.
While it may be argued that audit committees are the last .line of defe~se wh~n
it comes to financial reporting governance, this expectation m~y be mconslstent with their current structure. We encourage research on thiS fundamental
issue, including new insights on other possible structures for the audit committee that would enhance ACE.
The sections below highlight specific research opportunities within each
of the four ACE components. We also offer additional research questions, as
well as some thoughts on research methods.
5.1 Composition

First, we believe that it is important to enhance the richness of audit
committee composition measures. For example, additional work should use
more complete and specific assessments of audit committee member fmancial
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expertise, governance expertise, and independent thinking to ide~tify the factors most associated with ACE and to evaluate the types of expenence, knowledge, and abilities needed by audit committee members. For example, research
could address whether overall audit committee experience and current audit
committee tenure affect overall ACE. Studies that include such variables could
help to address questions about the need for audit committee member rotation.
Second, with recent recommendations and requirements related to member independence, fmancial expertise, and fmancial literacy, additional research is needed to assess changes in ACE as a result of the new requirements.
Interest should focus on whether the new requirements result in largely cosmetic changes or whether they appear to be associated with increased ACE.
Third, we highlight the need to push audit committee research beyond
individual-based studies to consider issues at the team level. While practical
constraints (e.g., accessing adequate numbers of subjects, accessing members
working in their committees) are prevalent, certain methods (e.g., field studies)
provide opportunities for progress on several questions. For example, future
research is needed to evaluate what mix of audit committee member backgrounds best promotes ACE. Numerous questions remain about whether audit
committees should be composed primarily of accounting experts or of members with a mix of fmance, accounting, and auditing competence. In addition,
our review of the literature indicates that there is relatively little research on
group variables (e.g., committee member interaction and teamwork, group
process loss and gain, member dominance) that can affect ACE. The team aspect of audit committees is essentially unexplored, yet considerable literature
in organizational behavior and psychology [e.g., see Guzzo and Shea, 1992]
could help to guide this research.
Finally, we encourage research on the ability of public companies to attract audit committee members in the current environment. Of particular interest is whether the ability to attract audit committee members varies with company characteristics such as size, industry, and proxies for agency costs.
5.2 Authority

First, we believe that additional research is needed to track the expansion
of audit committee responsibilities, including, for example, oversight of the
I!/I~ dom~in, i~ternational accounting and auditing issues, and the corporatIon s relationshIp to the external audit firm. The ITIIS area provides a good
example of such an emerging area because some are calling for the audit committee to expand its responsibilities in this area. KPMG's Audit Committee
Institute [2002] found that a majority (63%) of 700 audit committee members
and senior management members surveyed believe that "the board and/or audit
committee needs to improve their oversight of their company's information
security." The NACD [2001] highlighted the need to consider audit committee
responsibility over ITIIS domains and whether members are competent to provide effective oversight in this area. Similarly, Horton et al. [2000, p. 3] noted
that audit committees should "insist that systems and their users provide adequate management control and accountability balanced against the needs of the
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organization, and require that information be protected from unauthorized or
un~tended modification, destruction, disclosure, or other endangerment." The
rapid rate of growth and change in ITIIS, and relative ambiguity in audit committee responsibilities and capabilities in the area justify future study.
Second, we encourage research on the ultimate source of the audit committee's authority, the board of directors. Specifically, we recommend research
that investigates how and why the board's degree of reliance on the audit
committee varies and how this variation is associated with ACE. Finally, we
highlight the need for more authority research focusing on the relationships
and interfaces among audit committees and external auditors, internal auditors,
management, and legal counsel given the required dependencies among
groups. Such research could expand current understanding of how the audit
committee's authority is affected by its relationships with other participants in
the governance process.

5.3 Resources
First, we highlight the need for research on factors that are associated
with the quality of information provided to the audit committee and how information quality affects ACE. Research specifically addressing information
flow t<,> the audit committee could provide important insights on how to develop better information systems for audit committees.
Second, we suggest the need for research on the audit committee's use of
outside advisors in the pursuit of' ACE. Specifically, such research should
evaluate the extent that audit committees use outside advisors and the types of
support provided by such advisors. In addition, these resource studies could
test whether there is an association between ACE and advisor usage (or the
.
.
type of advisor), and whether any evidence of causal links exists.
Third additional research is needed to better understand the relatIOnships
among th~ audit committee, internal auditors, and external auditors. The audit
committee needs external and internal auditors to stay up-to-date on emerging
accounting issues and changes, as well as on certain company-specific issues.
For example, relevant and reliable information about technical accounting issues is essential for dealing with auditor-management disagreements. While
the experimental literature has started to address ACE in such disputes [e.g.,
DeZoort and Salterio, 2001 ; Knapp, 1987], more research is needed to understand audit committee interaction with and reliance on auditors, management,
and other stakeholders (e.g., legal counsel, other directors). In addition, we
suggest research on the dynamics of typical audit committee-auditor interactions and relationships, with specific focus on the impact of new regulations.
5.4 Diligence
The relative paucity of audit committee diligence research (beyond the
meeting frequency proxy) is probably due in large part to the methodological
challenges associated with measuring and assessing the construct. Diligence is
extremely difficult to observe directly, so innovative methods are needed for
progress in the area. Clearly, many opportunities for further research remain.
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First, we suggest that future studies consid~r alternati~e proxies for diligence or incentives when direct measurement IS not .posslble. For ~xam~le,
empirical research is needed to assess whether ACE. IS affected by mcentIve
variables such as audit committee member stock holdmgs or member compensation amount (e.g., base director stipend, base audit committee stipend, meeting fees) and type (e.g., cash, stock~. ~undamen~ll~, we need ~o address what
makes audit committee members vlgtlant and wlllmg to ask IIDpOrtant questions that challenge management, internal auditors, external auditors, and other
audit committee members. This stream of research also could focus on alternative forms of accountability (e.g., justification, feedback) and their impact on
member and committee performance, as well as on the risks / penalties associated with audit committee service. For example, it is important to understand
such factors as litigation risk, reputation damage, possible loss of future board
opportunities, etc. and their relation to audit committee member motivation.
Second, we suggest the need to focus on process variables such as setting
the committee agenda, evaluating and updating the charter, considering the
committee's responsibilities in the context of other committees' responsibilities, and gathering relevant and reliable information from management, external auditors, and internal auditors. Each of these variables is a potentially important component of diligence and could be useful in establishing
correlational or causal links to ACE.
5.5 Other Issues
One of the limitations of the ACE framework used in this paper is the
likely overlap and interaction among the four formative components. Additional research is needed to explore such issues. For example, understanding of
ACE could improve considerably from studies of how composition variables
(e.g., independence, expertise) interact with authority variables (e.g., degree of
board reliance on the audit committee) and resource variables (e.g., external
and internal auditor support). Future research also should examine the extent
to which stakeholders associate the quantity and quality of audit committee
disclosures with committee competence, authority, and/or diligence.
.
We also highlight the need to assess the generalizability of research fmdlOgs to date. For example, future research is needed to assess audit committee
performance in international and multinational settings. Specific issues of interest include (a) how U.S.-based fmdings related to ACE components apply in
international and multinational settings, (b) whether cultural and economic
differences affect the components of ACE, and (c) whether desired member
skill sets, resources, and diligence differ across country and culture. We also
encourage future ACE research that extends beyond publicly-traded companies
to evaluate the role of the audit committee in private companies and other organizations. Research could address the actual and perceived benefits of audit
committees in these settings, as well as auditors' focus on the audit committee
in assessing risk in such organizations.
Finally, we emphasize the need to consider alternative research methods
to triangulate the literature and provide new theoretical and practical insights
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to enhance ACE. Our review indicates the relative dominance of archival and
survey methods in audit committee studies to date. Psychology-based experimental research involving audit committee member judgnltmt and decision~
making is less common, presumably because of the inherent challenges in accessing directors. Analytical modeling and experimental markets (economics)
have yet to emerge in the audit committee literature, although they represent
viable methodological complements. For example, analytical modeling could
be useful in developing theory related to audit committee members' incentives
under different reward (compensation) and penalty (legal liability) schemes.
Alternatively, experimental markets lend themselves to the use of alternative
subject groups (e.g., students) in tightly controlled laboratory settings. Such
experiments could provide useful insights into the impact of incentives and
information quality and flow on ACE.
Ultimately, while the extant ACE literature provides many key insights,
our framework and synthesis of the literature highlight numerous opportunities
for improved understanding in the area. Given recent regulatory developments,
ACE research should continue to be of interest to academics, professionals,
and regulators. Researchers should continually monitor regulatory and professional developments to identify research projects that may directly contribute
to the national dialogue on corporate governance and fmancial reporting.
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ANNOTATED BmLIOGRAPHY
1. Knapp, M. C. 1987. ~ em.pirical s~dy o! audit committee support
for auditors involved in technIcal dIsputes WIth chent management. The Accounting Review 62 (July) 578-588.
Knapp conducted an experiment to investigate factors ~at c?uld ~u
ence audit committee member su,?port for the external audItor m ~udltor
management disputes. He hypothesized that members would be m~re likel~ to
support the auditor when they were. corporate managers, when a Big 8 auditor
was used, when the dispute was related to objective accounting standards, and
when the auditee was in poor fmancial condition. Using a repeated measures
design involving 179 audit committee members from California companies,
the experiment involved auditor-management disagreements on subsequent
event disclosure and materiality related to a proposed adjustment. The results
revealed overall support for auditors in the disputes, although support was
diminished when the members were not corporate managers, when the auditee
was in strong fmancial condition, and when objective professional standards
were absent.
2. Kalbers, L. P. and T. J. Fogarty. 1993. Audit committee effectiveness:
An empirical investigation of the contribution of power. Auditing: A Journal
of Practice & Theory 12 (Spring): 24-49.
Kalbers and Fogarty investigated the relation between ACE and audit
committee power. They hypothesized that audit committee effectiveness is a
function of the types and extent of audit committee power. Using LlSREL to
assess the results of a survey involving audit committees members from 90
U.S. corporations, they found that effectiveness included oversight of fmancial reporting, external auditors and internal control. In addition, the results
indicated that audit committee power within the organization came from a
combination of written authority and the clear support of top management.
3. DeZoort, F. T. 1998. An analysis of experience effects on audit committee members' judgments. Accounting, Organizations and Society 23
(January): 1-22.
DeZoort examined whether experience affects audit committee members'
oversight judgments. A sample of 87 audit committee members completed an
internal control oversight task to evaluate whether experience facilitated
comparability with a criterion group of external auditors. The results indicated that both general domain and task specific experience made a significant difference in audit committee members' internal control assessments.
Members with experience made internal control judgments more like auditors
than did members without experience. In addition, experienced audit committee members made more consistent judgments, had higher self-insight, higher
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consensus, and higher technical content levels for additional items provided
than did the members without experience.
4. Carcello, J. V. and T. L. Neal. 2000. Audit committee composition
and auditor reporting. The Accounting Review 75 (October): 453-467.
Carcello and Neal evaluated the relation between audit committee composition and the likelihood of receiving a going concern opinion. Using a
sample of 223 fmancially distressed companies from 1994, they found a negative association between the percentage of affiliated (inside and grey) members on the committee and the likelihood of receiving a going concern opinion
from the external auditor.
5. Klein, A. 2002a. Economic determinants of audit committee independence. The Accounting Review 77 (April): 435-452.
Klein explored factors associated with variations in audit committee independence. Using a sample of 803 fIrm-years on the S&P 500, she f0u.n d
that audit committee independence was positively associated with board .s~ze
and board independence and negatively associated with growth opportumtl~s
and fIrms with losses. The results suggest a negative relation between audIt
committee independence and the value relevance of accounting earnings.
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